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The “impossibility proof” on unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is examined. It is
shown that the possibility of juxtaposing quantum and classical randomness has not been properly
taken into account. A specific protocol that beats entanglement cheating with entanglement is
proved to be unconditionally secure.
Bit commitment is a kind of a cryptographic protocol
that can serve as a building block to achieve various cryp-
tographic objectives, such as user authentication. There
is a nearly universal acceptance of the general impossibil-
ity of secure quantum bit commitment (QBC), taken to
be a consequence of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
type entanglement cheating which supposedly rules out
QBC and other quantum protocols that have been pro-
posed for various cryptographic objectives. In a bit
commitment scheme, one party, Adam, provides another
party, Babe, with a piece of evidence that he has chosen
a bit b (0 or 1) which is committed to her. Later, Adam
would open the commitment by revealing the bit b to
Babe and convincing her that it is indeed the committed
bit with the evidence in her possession and whatever fur-
ther evidence Adam then provides, which she can verify.
The usual concrete example is for Adam to write down
the bit on a piece of paper, which is then locked in a safe
to be given to Babe, while keeping for himself the safe
key that can be presented later to open the commitment.
The scheme should be binding, i.e., after Babe receives
her evidence corresponding to a given bit value, Adam
should not be able to open a different one and convince
Babe to accept it. It should also be concealing, i.e., Babe
should not be able to tell from her evidence what the bit
b is. Otherwise, either Adam or Babe would be able to
cheat successfully.
In standard cryptography, secure bit commitment is to
be achieved either through a trusted third party, or by
invoking an unproved assumption concerning the com-
plexity of certain computational problems. By utilizing
quantum effects, specifically the intrinsic uncertainty of
a quantum state, various QBC schemes not involving a
third party have been proposed to be unconditionally
secure (US), in the sense that neither Adam nor Babe
could cheat with any significant probability of success
as a matter of physical laws. In 1995-1996, a suppos-
edly general proof of the impossibility of unconditionally
secure QBC, and the insecurity of previously proposed
protocols, were presented [1]-[5]. Henceforth it has been
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generally accepted that secure QBC and related objec-
tives are impossible as a matter of principle [6]-[11].
There is basically just one impossibility proof (IP),
which gives the EPR attacks for the cases of equal and
unequal density operators that Babe has for the two dif-
ferent bit values. The proof purports to show that if
Babe’s successful cheating probability PBc is close to the
value 1/2, which is obtainable from pure guessing of the
bit value, then Adam’s successful cheating probability
PAc is close to the perfect value 1. The impossibility proof
describes the EPR attack on a specific type of proto-
cols, and then argues that all possible QBC protocols are
of this type. Since there is no mathematical characteri-
zation of all possible QBC protocols - no mathematical
definition of a QBC protocol exists with the justification
that it includes all protocols that would achieve bit com-
mitment - a priori there can be no general impossibility
proof. A general analysis of the situation is provided in
[12]. In this paper, we pinpoint the gaps in the IP in-
volving quantum versus classical randomness that make
possible a relatively simple QBC protocol that utilizes
classical random numbers generated in any usual way.
This particular protocol depends critically on verifying
split entangled pairs used as anonymous states [13, 14]
which Babe first transmitted to Adam in a two-stage pro-
tocol, thus beating entanglement with entanglement [16].
The impossibility proof, in its claimed generality, has
never been systematically spelled out in one place, but
the essential ideas that constitute this proof are gener-
ally agreed upon [2]-[11]. The formulation and the proof
can be cast as follows. Adam and Babe have available
to them two-way quantum communications that termi-
nate in a finite number of exchanges, during which either
party can perform any operation allowed by the laws of
quantum physics, all processes ideally accomplished with
no imperfection of any kind. During these exchanges,
Adam would have committed a bit with associated evi-
dence to Babe. It is argued that, at the end of the com-
mitment phase, there is an entangled pure state |Φb〉,
b ∈ {0, 1}, shared between Adam who possesses state
space HA, and Babe who possesses HB. For example,
if Adam sends Babe one of M possible states {|φbi〉} for
bit b with probability pbi, then
|Φb〉 =
∑
i
√
pbi|ei〉|φbi〉 (1)
with orthonormal |ei〉 ∈ HA and known |φbi〉 ∈ HB.
2Adam would open by making a measurement on HA,
say {|ei〉}, communicating to Babe his result i0 and b;
then Babe would verify by measuring the corresponding
projector |φbi0 〉〈φbi0 | on HB, accepting as correct only
the result 1. More generally, one may consider the whole
|Φb〉 of (1) as the state corresponding to the bit b, with
Adam sending HA to Babe upon opening, so she can
verify by projection measurement on |Φb〉〈Φb|.
Classical random numbers are routinely used in classi-
cal cryptographic protocols, and so must be allowed in a
quantum protocol. In the IP, they are handled as follows.
When classical random numbers known only to one party
are used in the commitment, they are to be replaced by
corresponding quantum state purification. The commit-
ment of |φbi〉 with probability pbi in (1) is, in fact, an
example of such purification. Generally, for any random
k used by Babe, it is argued that from the doctrine of
the “Church of the Larger Hilbert Space” [9], it is to be
replaced by the purification |Ψ〉 in HB ⊗HB,
|Ψ〉 =
∑
k
√
λk|ψk〉|fk〉, (2)
where |ψk〉 ∈ HB and the |fk〉′s are complete orthonor-
mal in HB kept by Babe while HC would be sent to
Adam. With such purification, it is claimed that any
protocol involving classical secret parameters would be-
come quantum-mechanically determinate, i.e., the shared
state |Φb〉 at the end of commitment is completely known
to both parties. This means that both {λk} and {|fk〉}
are taken to be known exactly to both Babe and Adam.
The IP assumes that Babe is honest (and Adam is also
honest in a multi-stage protocol [11, 17],[3]) in using the
agreed upon {λk} and {|fk〉}, and then claims that un-
conditional security is impossible. We will retain this
assumption in this paper to show that the IP reasoning
is incorrect. However, US QBC is possible even when
this assumption is dropped by using a cheat-testing pro-
cedure [14, 16].
In the purification (2), exactly which orthonormal
{|fk〉} is used does not affect the anonymous nature of
{|ψk〉}. Why then does {|fk〉} have to be agreed upon
and known to Adam? This issue is not addressed in the
IP. Clearly, a choice from a set of possible {|f lk〉}, l ∈
{1, · · · , L} with a priori probabilities {pl}, both openly
known, can be picked secretly by Babe using a classical
random number generator for each transmission of |Ψ〉.
If the protcol is concealing for every l, Adam has no right
to demand the knowledge of l. On the other hand, the
IP may not go through as {|fk〉} or the total
|Φb〉 =
∑
ik
√
pbiλk|ei〉|fk〉|φbik〉 (3)
is not known to Adam. This is the anonymous state
idea [13, 14] for building US QBC protocols. It should
be noted that if Babe, e.g., picks {|ψk〉} by throwing
a die with probabilities {λk}, she herself would not be
able to tell what the {|fk〉} is. Thus, physically, it is
totally unreasonable to assume that Adam knows the
{|fk〉} in an anonymous state protocol. Similarly, as just
noted, Babe may just send a classically randomly cho-
sen {|ψk〉} so long as the protocol is concealing for every
k. As it turns out [14], if the protocol is perfectly con-
cealing (PBc = 1/2), Adam’s cheating transformation U
A
on HA that brings |Φ0〉 to |Φ1〉 = UA ⊗ IB|Φ0〉 is inde-
pendent of {|fk〉} or the specific |ψk〉, under either of
the following conditions: (a) Babe verifies by first mea-
suring {|fk〉} and then checking |ψk〉, or (b) Adam’s b-
dependent commitment action does not change the com-
posite index k to get one unknown state to another un-
known state for him. One way, among others, to show
this is to use the result in [14] that explicitly determines
UA in terms of |Φb〉 of (1) or (3), which can be achieved
by a simple matrix transformation argument [15]. Let
Uij ≡ 〈ei|UA|ej〉,Λji ≡ √pipj〈φ1i|φ0j〉, |Λ| = (ΛΛ†)1/2.
Then [14, 15]
ΛU = |Λ|. (4)
Generalization to ǫ-concealing (PBc = 1/2 + ǫ) protocols
of this behavior can be expected.
However, a perfectly concealing US protocol may be
obtained from the use of (2) with |ψk〉 being an entangled
state split between Adam and Babe during commitment
with Adam’s b-dependent commitment action changing
the composite index k, while verification is carried out on
the total entangled |ψk〉. Such a split entangled state by
itself does not lead to a binding protocol for known{|fk〉},
but together with the use of a secretly chosen |f lk〉 as de-
scribed above, Adam would not be able to cheat perfectly
(PAc = 1). Thus, an ǫ-binding protocol for any ǫ > 0 is
obtained in a sufficiently long n-sequence in the standard
fashion [3]. In the following, we describe the specific pro-
tocol (which we call QBC4) that achieves unconditional
security in the above fashion.
Let |mj〉j , j ∈ {µ, ν}, mj ∈ {1, 2}, be two openly
known orthonormal qubit states, 〈1|2〉 = 0, for each of
the two possible j. When there is no ambiguity, we would
write |mj〉j simply as |m〉j to simplify notation. Let Babe
prepare two states
|Ψj〉 = 1√
2
∑
m
|m〉j |gm〉j , (5)
where |m〉j ∈ HBjα, m ∈ {1, 2}, and {|gm〉j |m = 1, 2}
form an orthonormal basis in HBjβ for each j ∈ {µ, ν},
with |Ψj〉 ∈ HBjα⊗HBjβ on two qubits for each j. We have
skipped one subscript j in |gmj〉j as in |m〉j to simplify
notation. Let HBα ≡ HBµα ⊗ HBνα, HBβ ≡ HBµβ ⊗ HBνβ ,
HB ≡ HBα ⊗HBβ .
Babe keeps HBβ and sends the ordered pair of qubits
HBα to Adam. Adam applies the following transformation
on HBjα separately for each j: |Ψj〉 becomes |Φj〉 ∈ HAj ⊗
HBjα ⊗HBjβ :
|Φj〉 = 1√
8
∑
m,i
|ei〉jVi|m〉j |gm〉j , (6)
3where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, {|ei〉j} complete orthonormal in
HAj , and Vi are four unitary qubit operators given by I,
σx, −iσy, σz in terms of the Pauli spin operators when |1〉
and |2〉 lie on the qubit z-axis. Eq. (6) can be obtained
by the unitary transformation
∑
i |ei〉jj〈ei|⊗Vi on HA⊗HBjα with initial state |ψA〉 ∈ HA that has 〈ei|ψA〉j = 12 .
To commit b = 0, Adam sends back HBµα ⊗ HBνα in the
original order, and he switches them to HBνα ⊗ HBµα to
commit b = 1. He opens by announcing b, the order of
the two HBjα he committed, and submitting the ordered
qubit pair HA ≡ HAµ ⊗ HAν . Babe verifies by measuring
the corresponding projections to |Φµ〉|Φν〉 of (6). The
general situation is depicted in Fig. 1.
It is easy to verify by tracing over HA that for ei-
ther b, ρB
0
= ρB
1
= IB/16 on HB, for any orthonormal
{|gm〉j}. If Babe entangles over the possible choices of
such {|gm〉j} via {|fk〉}, a simple calculation shows that
perfect concealing ρBC
0
= ρBC
1
onHB⊗HC is maintained,
where HC is the space Babe used to carry out such en-
tanglement. Similarly, pefect concealing is maintained
with further entanglement of {|f lk〉} with {pl}. This hap-
pens because the Vi operations by Adam totally disen-
tangle the state on HBα ⊗HBβ ⊗HC into a product state
IBα /4 ⊗ ρBCβ for either b, and there is no identity that
individuates a qubit by itself, that is not entangled or
correlated to another.
Intuitively, we intend to guarantee binding by the fact
that HBjβ = HBµβ ⊗ HBνβ in Babe’s possession cannot
be switched to HBνβ ⊗ HBµβ by operating on HA ⊗ HBα
alone. However, this is possible if the two orthonormal
sets {|gm〉j} are known. Indeed, this is the content of
the impossibility proof [18]. Thus, to guarantee security,
Babe needs to employ different choices of {|gk′m〉j} with
different bases indexed by k′. She may employ a fixed
probability distribution {pk′j} for each j, and entangle
these via orthonormal {|gk′〉j}, ad infinitum. This pos-
sible chain of purifications has to stop somewhere, and
we simply stop it at HB without HC . As we have seen,
this does not affect perfect concealing so that Babe is
free to choose any orthonormal {|gm〉j}. In the notation
of (2), the effective {|ψk〉} in this case is |Ψk′µ 〉|Ψk
′
ν 〉 de-
termined by {|gk′m〉}, with further entanglement to |fk〉 of
(2) described by HC above. In the notation of (2), k is
the ordered triple (µ, ν, k′) for fixed {|gk′m〉}. It is clearly
unreasonable for Adam to demand such knowledge, as
discussed above and codified in the Secrecy Principle of
Ref. [18]. This possibility is neglected in the impossibility
proof.
To see exactly how binding is obtained in the present
situation, note that the perfect cheating transformation
UA is determined by Eq. (4), which is unique up to a
phase factor in this nondegenerate situation. It depends
on {|gm〉j} in the present case with state-space switching,
i.e. µ, ν-switching where {µ, ν} is part of the composite
index k, in contrast to merely 〈gm|gm′〉 = δmm′ , i.e.,
no dependence on the actual {|gm〉} in the case without
switching in the absence of j. Thus, Adam cannot cheat
perfectly. Note that the generalized IP result from [14]
does not apply here because Adam’s b-dependent com-
mitment action re-arranges the µ, ν part of the composite
index k of (2), which in turn demands entanglement or
correlation from Babe in order that she can verify such
re-arrangement. On the other hand, quantum entangle-
ment instead of classical correlation is also needed here
– Babe cannot verify by first measuring {|m〉j} because
Adam would be able to determine the |m〉j with a mea-
surement if he knows that is the way Babe would verify.
Thus, we are indeed beating entanglement with entangle-
ment. On the other hand, Adam’s entanglement is not
essential. As usual in QBC protocols, the whole proce-
dure works the same if Adam chooses the Vi on HBµα and
HBνα classically and opens by telling Babe his choice.
We have assumed as usual that Adam opens b = 0
perfectly. Let pA < 1 be Adam’s optimum probability of
cheating for a given choice of {|gk′m〉j} and {pk′j}, taking
into account also all his other obvious imperfect cheat-
ing possibilities, such as simply announcing a different b.
We have thus shown that the formulation and the rea-
soning of the impossibility proof break down already in
this simple pair |Φµ〉|Φν〉 situation.
When b = 0 pefect opening condition is relaxed, it
is clear that Adam still cannot cheat perfectly, but it is
possible that the overall successful opening probability
(honest plus cheating) may be improved. By continuity
it can be seen that Adam’s optimum cheating probability
P¯Ac is arbitrarily close to pA =
1
2
if the b = 0 opening
probability is arbitrarily close to 1, the case of interest.
Protocol QBC4 is obtained when the above proto-
col, to be called QBC4p, is extended to a sequence of
{|Ψnµ〉|Ψnν〉}, n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, each of the form (5),
with |gnm〉j ∈ HBnjβ , |mn〉j ∈ HBnjβ , etc. Babe should
send Adam {HBnµα⊗HBnνα} and Adam should commit to
Babe these spaces for all µ after he entangles them with
HAnµ ⊗HAnν using the Vi operations, permuting each pair
for b = 1. He opens by announcing b and the state of
the qubits in each HBnα and submitting {HAn }, with Babe
verifyng |Φnµ〉|Φnν〉 ∈ HAn ⊗HBn after possible rearrange-
ment for each n. Since there is no new entanglement
possibility for Adam, the protocol is perfectly concealing
with P¯Ac = p
n
A going to zero exponentially in N . Thus,
QBC4 is perfectly concealing and ǫ-binding for any ǫ > 0
by letting N be large. We summarize our perfectly con-
cealing and ǫ-binding protocol:
4PROTOCOL QBC4
(i) Babe sends Adam N ordered pairs {HBnµα ⊗
HBnνα} of qubit pairs, n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, which are
entangled to {HBnµβ ⊗H
B
nνβ} in her possession in
states |Ψnµ〉|Ψnν〉 of the form (5), with indepen-
dent random choices of {|gk
′
m〉j} with probability
{pk′j}.
(ii) To commit b, Adam applies, for each n,∑
i |ei〉〈ei|⊗Vi on H
A
n ⊗H
B
nα, resulting in a state
|Φnµ〉|Φnν 〉 given via the form (6), and sends
{HBnα} to Babe as evidence for b = 0, while
switching the order ot each HBnµα ⊗ H
B
nνα for
b = 1.
(iii) Adam opens by announcing b, the order of the
qubits in each HBnα, and submitting {H
A
n }. Babe
verifies by projective measurements of {|Φnµ〉},
{|Φnν 〉}, for all n.
In conclusion, the possibility of unconditionally secure
quantum bit commitment opens up the possibility of
many cryptographic functions, including secure multi-
party computation. It would be of interest to develop
practically feasible secure QBC protocols [12] for such
applications.
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